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INTRODUCTION 
Recent estimates show that after falling in the 1980s, poverty has made a 
comeback in Pakistan during the 1990s. The Government of Pakistan (GOP) 
estimate show an increase in caloric poverty headcount from 17 percent in 1987-88 
to 33 percent in 1998-99 and also rising income inequality during the 1990s.1 In 
contrast preliminary estimates by the World Bank show that poverty may not have 
risen as rapidly during the 1990s and may even have stagnated.2 Slow down in 
economic growth, rising open unemployment, rising food and non-food prices, 
reduction in the fiscal space for pro-poor public programmes, poor governance 
hampering delivery of social services to the poor; are factors that have been 
attributed to the growing poverty and vulnerability of households in recent years. 
The Government has recently taken some important initiatives to deal with 
rising poverty. These include the Rs 21 billion Integrated Rural Urban Development 
public works programme, establishment of the Khushali Bank (Micro-Finance Bank) 
and the Food Support Programme for poor households with income less than Rs 
2000/ PM. These programmes are in addition to the existing public social safety net 
programmes such as Zakat/Ushr and Pakistan Baitul Maal, and the Social Action 
Programme. The ongoing work on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is a 
laudable effort by the government to take poverty issues seriously and to come up 
with a poverty reduction strategy in a consultative and participatory manner.  
What are the demand responses of poor and non-poor households in periods 
of rising poverty? Do poor households bear a relatively higher burden of rising food 
prices? Which income groups would be most affected by rising electricity, natural 
gas and petroleum prices? Which groups are likely to feel the impact of the General 
Sales Tax on goods and services? This paper is motivated by these questions that are 
being asked regularly in the media and in discussions on poverty issues by 
researchers and policy-makers. 
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1Source: Economic Survey, 1999-2000. 
2World Bank estimates preliminary show that Basic Needs poverty headcount was 27 percent in 
1996-97, compared to 35 percent in 1990-91.  
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In providing answers to the questions posed above, we use the well-established 
Linear Expenditure System (LES) methodology to derive price, cross-price and income 
elasticity of demand for food and non-food items for different types of Pakistani 
households. The LES and Extended LES (ELES) models have been used extensively in 
the Pakistani literature to study household behaviour [See Ali (1985); Ahmad, Ludlow 
and Stern (1988); Burney and Akhtar (1990) and Burney and Akmal (1991)]. This no 
cutting edge technique in terms of econometric sophistication, and is also known to 
have many limitations.3 However, we feel that this methodology would allow us to get 
a first cut at answering the above questions, using the rich information on sources of 
incomes and consumption expenditures from household surveys. 
We use the latest available Household Integrated Expenditure Survey (HIES), 
1996-97, and disaggregated household categories to analyse household expenditure 
patterns and demand responses. The HIES 1996-97 is a nationally representative 
survey of 14,900 households in all four Provinces of Pakistan and in Azad Jammu 
and Kashmir. We have divided the households by location into rural/urban4 and 
within each group into: (1) the Bottom 40 percent, (2) Middle 40 percent and (3) Top 
20 percent based on per capita expenditures.5 The rationale is to take a closer look at 
demand patterns and responses of households who would be below or close to a 
Basic Needs poverty line (bottom 40 percent households)6; and compare these with 
responses of the middle and upper income households. Per capita household 
expenditure, a standard poverty indicator, has been used to rank households.7 
Expenditures rather than incomes have been used in the analysis because of the non-
reliability of income data in household surveys in Pakistan.8 
The profile of the bottom 40 percent households, compared to the Middle 40 
percent and Top 20 percent households, shows that the poor have larger families 
with more children and younger adults; high dependency ratios; very low literacy 
levels and education of the head of the household; and the head of household mostly 
employed in agriculture or as self-employed in small or household enterprises.      
 
3The underlying utility function assumes separable additive preferences, which imply that 
marginal utility of one good is independent of other goods consumed. It also results in linear Engles 
curves. The reliability of the identification needed to get the elasticity estimates is also questionable. 
Elasticity estimates are strongly influenced by the chosen functional form. 
4HIES’s administrative categories have been used to define rural and urban households. 
5Initially we divided both rural and urban households into five quintiles based on per capita 
expenditures. We found fairly similar results for the bottom two quintiles and the 3rd and 4th quintiles. 
Hence we have aggregated the households into 3 categories: Bottom 40 percent, Middle 40 percent and 
Top 20 percent.   
6Several recent estimates of poverty show poverty head counts based on the calorie method to be 
around 32–33 percent, and basic needs poverty of 35–38 percent. We associate the Bottom 40 percent 
households as the poor according to the Basic Needs definition.   
7We also derived results using household expenditures as the sorting and the dependent variable. 
The demand responses were not very different whether we used per capita expenditures or household 
expenditures as the dependent variable and hence we only report the former results.   
8Standard HIES definition of expenditure has been used in this paper, including all monthly and 
yearly expenditures on non-durable goods and certain annual expenditures on durable goods.  
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Per Capita Income and Expenditure Trends and Patterns in Pakistan 
We first take a look at the aggregate trends of per capita incomes and 
expenditures of households in Pakistan. Estimates of per capita incomes and 
expenditures from household surveys and the National Accounts are shown in   
Table 1. 9 Both the HIES estimates and the National Accounts show that nominal per 
capita incomes and expenditures rose substantially over the mid-1980s to mid-1990s. 
HIES estimates indicate a very modest increase in real terms in per capita incomes 
and expenditures in Pakistan over this period. The picture of stagnating real incomes 
and expenditures is less evident from the National Account data. Compared to the 
HIES, the National Accounts estimates of per capita real incomes are 40–60 percent 
higher and show a slow rising trend during 1987-88 and 1996-97. 
There is less discrepancy between the National Accounts and the HIES 
estimates of real per capita expenditures; the latter are 15–30 percent lower than the 
former. Still the National Accounts portray a much more optimistic picture of 
nominal and real per capita expenditure trends in Pakistan compared to the 
household survey data. To come to definitive conclusions about trends of household 
incomes and expenditures in Pakistan, there needs to be more compatibility between 
different sources of data. Using HIES as the more reliable and direct source of data, 
we find that real incomes have risen on average by 1 percent per capita annually 
whereas real per capita expenditures have grown by only 0.5 percent between 1987–
88 and 1996–97.  
 
Table 1 
Nominal and Real Per Capita Annual Incomes and Expenditures (Rs) 
 1987-88 1990-91 1992-93 1993-94 1996-97 
 Household Integrated Expenditure Surveys 
Nominal Income  4059 5804 6731 7329 11150 
Nominal Expenditures 3870 5223 6593 7168 10004 
Real Income*  2679 2905 2779 2715 2950 
Real Expenditures* 2555 2614 2722 2655 2647 
 National Accounts 
Nominal Income  6862 9546 11749 13373 19212 
Nominal Expenditures 4739 6374 8440 9511 14280 
Real Income  4379 4656 4809 4852 4992 
Real Expenditures 3091 3015 3340 3378 3792 
Source: HIES various years; Economic Survey, 1999-2000. 
Note: *Real incomes and expenditures have been deflated using CPI (1980-81=100). Real incomes and 
expenditures from the National Account are at constant factor cost of 1980-81. 
 
9The National Accounts estimates of nominal and real per capita incomes at market prices have 
been used as the income indicator. We have taken the nominal and real values of Private Consumption 
Expenditures from the National Accounts, and divided it by the population to get the series of per capita 
household expenditures from the National Accounts.   
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The reasons for these trends could be found in slow down in economic growth 
rates, rapidly rising price levels, and a relatively high population growth rate. 
Economic growth rates have slowed down from an average of 6 percent during the 
1980s to 5 percent in first half of the 1990s and 4 percent in the latter half. Fig. 1 
shows significant annual fluctuations in economic growth rate during 1987-88 to 
1996-97. The year for we have done most of our analysis (1996-97) was a pretty bad 
year—the growth rate was less than 2 percent. Keeping 1987-88 as the base, we find 
that price levels have increased in general by 2½ times between 1987-88 and 1996-
97 (see Fig. 2). The fastest rise in price levels is seen for categories such as food, 
beverages and tobacco; fuel and lighting; and medicines.  These items comprise a 
major share of the budget of the poorest households as discussed below. 
Food forms the bulk of expenditures for both rural and urban households and 
across different income groups as shown in Tables 2 and 3. Our overall results are 
quite similar to those reported other studies, showing the dominance of food 
expenditures in Pakistani household budgets. Not only are the poorest households 
spending a major portion of their budgets on food, their shares of food expenditures 
has increased over time.10 This indicates that the poorest household are bearing an 
increasingly burden of higher food hikes and reduction in food subsidies. 
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Source: Economic Survey
Fig. 1. GDP Growth Rate (%). 
 
 
10The share of food expenditure of the bottom 40 percent has increased by 2-3 percent during 
1987-88 to 1996-97. 
Sour e:  E onomic Survey, Government of Pakistan. 
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Fig. 2. Price Indices (1987-88 = 100). 
 
Table 2 
Average Per Capita Expenditure Shares—Urban Households (Percent) 
1987-88 1996-97  
Overall Bottom 
40% 
Middle 
40% 
Top  
20% 
Overall Bottom 
40% 
Middle 
40% 
Top  
20% 
Food 42 51 47 39 42 53 47 35 
Fuel 5 6 5 5 6 8 7 5 
Clothing 5 6 5 4 5 6 6 5 
Education 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 
Footwear 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 
Housing 21 18 19 23 25 16 21 30 
Medical Care 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 
Personal Care 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Recreation 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 
Transportation 5 3 4 6 5 2 3 7 
Furniture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Others 11 6 8 13 7 5 5 8 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Calculated from HIES 1987-88 and 1996-97. 
Food, 
Beverages 
and Tobacco 
House 
Rent 
Fuel and 
Lighting 
Transport and 
Communication
Apparel, 
Textile & 
Footwear 
Recreation, 
Entertainment 
and Education 
Medicines 
Source: Economic Survey, Government of Pakistan. 
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Table 3 
Average Per Capita Expenditure Shares—Rural Households (percent) 
1987-88 1996-97  
Overall Bottom 
40% 
Middle 
40% 
Top  
20% 
Overall Bottom 
40% 
Middle 
40% 
Top  
20% 
Food 53 55 54 49 54 58 56 50 
Fuel 5 7 6 5 8 8 8 8 
Clothing 5 6 6 5 6 7 7 6 
Education 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Footwear 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Housing 11 12 12 11 14 12 13 16 
Medical Care 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Personal Care 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 
Recreation 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Transportation 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 
Furniture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Others 12 8 10 15 6 4 5 7 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Calculated from HIES 1987-88 and 1996-97. 
 
There are some distinct differences in the expenditure patterns of rural and 
urban households. Rural households spend on average 54 percent of their budgets on 
food, whereas urban household’s average per capita food expenditure is 42 percent.11 
Within the food group there are more similarities between rural and urban 
households expenditures now, compared to what was reported in earlier studies.12 
Except for cereals and milk/milk products, for which the share of rural households is 
higher, for most other food categories the expenditure patterns of both rural and 
urban households are quite analogous. This may be due to the “demonstration” effect 
of urban consumption pattern in rural areas or better marketing and availability of 
processed foods in rural areas over the years. 
As expected, the urban households spend a larger share of their budget on 
housing, education, transportation and recreation compared to rural households. 
Higher education expenditures in urban areas are mainly due to higher school fees. 
According to the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 1996-97 results, close to 50 
percent of the primary school children go to relatively expensive private schools in 
urban areas. On average annual per capita educational expenses are twice as high in 
urban areas.13 Higher valuation of the urban housing stock and relatively higher 
 
11Burney and Akmal (1988) found per capita expenditure on food by rural and urban households 
to be 52 percent and 44 percent, respectively, using HIES 1984-85. Food expenditures comprised 51 
percent of household expenditures in 1979 [see Ali (1985)]. 
12For instance, Ahmad, Ludlow and Stern (1988) and Ahmad and Ludlow (1987) showed 
significant differences in demand patterns and marginal budget shares between rural and urban areas, 
based on the 1976 Micro Nutrient Survey and 1979 HIES, respectively.  
13Source: PIHS 1996-97. PIHS data show that both school fees and other educational expenses are 
higher in urban areas, even in government schools/colleges.  
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share of expenditures on rented houses in urban areas results in the observed 
differences in rural and urban housing expenditures.14 Meanwhile, expenditure 
allocation on fuel, clothing, footwear, medical care, personal care and others (gifts, 
ceremonies) are fairly similar across both rural and urban households. 
Assuming that HIES surveys of 1987-88 and 1996-97 are fairly comparable, 
the biggest increase in the expenditures allocations have been on fuel and housing for 
both rural and urban households. Household budget shares have also increased for 
food, clothing, and education. Over time, households in Pakistan have allocated an 
increasing share of their budgets toward basic needs such as food, fuel, housing, 
education and clothing and have reduced their budgetary allocations for non-
essential categories such as recreation, personal care and other expenses (mainly 
expenses on ceremonies, gifts, etc.). These trends are indicative of tight budget 
constraint being faced by both rural and urban households, as food and non-food 
prices have risen over time and real income growth has been relatively slow. 
The bottom 40 percent households seem to be burdened with just meeting 
their basic needs. Close to 85 percent of the budget of the poorest households is 
taken up by the most essential needs—food, shelter, fuel, and clothing. In both rural 
and urban areas, the poorest households spend between 53–58 percent of their budget 
on food. Approximately ¾ of their food budget is spent on 6-7 major items, namely 
wheat/wheat flour, milk/milk products, ghee, sugar/gur, vegetables, and pulses. 
Lower or negligible expenditures on housing, recreation, education (in urban areas), 
and transportation, indicate that these expenditures are generally for poorer quality 
good and services or for limited quantities.   
The expenditure pattern of the urban Top 20 percent households is quite 
distinct. They spend close to ⅓ of their budget each on food and housing, compared 
to other groups who spend ½ or more of their budget on food and between 12–21 
percent on housing. The urban rich spend somewhat lower shares of their budgets on 
fuel/lighting and use the most efficient energy sources such as piped gas and 
electricity. In contrast, the fuel/lightning budgets of other groups are largely spend 
on firewood in rural areas and a combination of firewood, electricity, and gas in 
urban areas. The urban rich are also the biggest consumers of petroleum products for 
transportation needs and are most directly hit by increase in POL prices. In contrast, 
the rural top 20 percent seem relatively middle class in terms of their expenditure 
behavior, showing expenditure patterns quite similar to the rural and urban middle 40 
percent households.  
Although the above analysis provides a rather static view of expenditure 
patterns of Pakistani households at two points in time, some tentative conclusions 
can be made about dynamic trends as well. It seems that disparities in income and 
expenditure patterns that are currently revealed in Tables 2 and 3 are likely to persist 
 
14More than 60 percent of housing expenditure for both rural and urban households is mainly the 
imputed value of owner occupied housing. 
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over time. Expenditure on education, which is an indicator of current investments in 
human capital, is twice as high for the two top urban groups relative to other groups. 
This indicates that the urban top income groups, who already enjoy higher levels of 
income, have access to the better urban infrastructure and social services, live in 
good neighbourhoods, drive their own cars, etc. are also investing much more in the 
quality education of their children. Thus possibilities of upward mobility through 
investments in human capital and the equalising effects of good education on class 
disparities are not visible for rural households or the poorest urban group. It is quite 
likely that current disparities would persist along the rural-urban dimension as well 
as across income classes in the future in Pakistan. 
In short, the above analysis indicates that Pakistani households are feeling the 
pinch of price hikes and slow growth since the mid 1980s. They are adjusting their 
budgets to cope with these effects by increasing expenditures on food, fuel and 
housing and cutting back the allocations for discretionary expenditures such as 
recreation, personal effects, ceremonies and gifts. 
 
Demand Responses 
In order to gain some insights into households’ response to rising prices and 
falling real incomes, we have derived own-price elasticity and total expenditure 
elasticity of demand using a Linear Expenditure System (LES).15 The expenditure 
elasticity of demand could be thought of as a proxy for the elasticity of demand with 
respect to permanent income, especially given the non-reliability of income data. All 
own-price elasticity estimates are negative. Our overall results using the HIES 1996-97 
correspond quite well to comparable estimates in the literature. Similar to Ahmad et al. 
and Burney et al. we find higher own-price and expenditure elasticity estimates in rural 
areas relative to urban areas, and fairly low cross price effects except for food.16   
Table 4 and 5 show that uncompensated own price elasticity estimates for the 
poorest 40 percent urban and rural households have a much narrower range 
compared to the middle 40 percent and top 20 percent households. This indicates that 
the poorest households have little room to adjust to price hikes compared to other 
income groups. Hence, the impact of price hikes in general, and particularly for food, 
fuel, clothing, and housing, that devour 85 percent of the budget of the poor, is likely 
to have a huge impact on these households. 
We find that own-price elasticity of demand for essential foods (Food1) and 
non-essential foods (Food2)17 are higher for the poorest households. This implies that 
 
15The LES model was estimated using OLS. Recreation expenditure was taken as the numeraire. 
The model showed good fit and reasonably high R2. The model is described in the Annex. 
16We have not reported the cross-price effects because the cross-price elasticities were generally 
quite negligible.   
17Food1 and Food2 comprise 75 percent and 25 percent, respectively, of total food expenditures 
by all income groups. Food1 includes items such as cereals, pulses, milk and milk products, vegetables, 
ghee/cooking oil, tea/coffee, sugar, etc. Food2 includes, baked and friend products, mutton, beef, chicken, 
eggs, fruits, beverages, and miscellaneous foods.   
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Table 4 
Uncompensated Own Prices Elasticity of Demand—Urban 
Bottom 40% Middle 40% Top 20% 
Fuel –0.31 Food1 –0.38 Food1 -0.33 
Footwear –0.36 Footwear –0.48 Clothing -0.46 
Clothing –0.37 Fuel –0.48 Footwear –0.46 
Medical Care –0.38 Clothing –0.51 Medical Care –0.51 
Personal Care –0.46 Personal Care –0.57 Fuel –0.54 
Food1 –0.48 Medical Care –0.66 Education –0.59 
Education –0.49 Others –0.69 Personal Care –0.65 
Others –0.53 Food2 –0.82 Food2 –0.69 
Transportation –0.54 Education –0.91 Furniture –1.07 
Food2 –0.57 Housing –0.93 Housing –1.08 
Housing –0.61 Furniture –0.93 Others –1.15 
Furniture –0.88 Transportation –0.99 Transportation –1.43 
Source: Estimated from HIES 1996-97. 
 
Table 5 
Uncompensated Own Prices Elasticity of Demand—Rural 
Bottom 40% Middle 40% Top 20% 
Clothing –0.41 Clothing –0.55 Footwear –0.21 
Medical Care –0.45 Medical Care –0.63 Clothing –0.22 
Personal Care –0.46 Personal Care –0.63 Food1 –0.34 
Fuel –0.48 Footwear –0.66 Personal Care –0.35 
Transportation –0.48 Others –0.66 Food2 –0.47 
Footwear –0.50 Food1 –0.67 Furniture –0.75 
Housing –0.51 Fuel –0.68 Education –0.78 
Education –0.55 Food2 –0.74 Housing –0.81 
Others –0.56 Transportation –0.81 Medical Care –0.96 
Food1 –0.64 Education –0.81 Transportation –1.07 
Food2 –0.66 Housing –0.84 Others –1.16 
Furniture –0.96 Furniture –1.54 Fuel –1.19 
Source: Estimated from HIES 1996-97. 
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as food prices increase the poor are forced to cut back their food expenditures 
relatively more compared to other groups. These results indicate that in general the 
poor households may be experiencing extreme distress due to rising food and non-
food prices during the 1990s.18 The observation that caloric/food poverty is 
increasing in Pakistan in recent years is also supported by our results. These results 
make a very strong case for a food support programme for the poorest and most 
vulnerable households in Pakistan. 
Demand for fuel is relatively inelastic for the poorest households compared to 
other groups, implying that rising fuel prices are likely to have a significant impact 
on poor households. However, the argument that the poor are going to bear the brunt 
of rising utility prices does not hold up in our analysis. Our results show that the 
most direct burden of rising utility prices (e.g. electricity, gas) would be borne by the 
upper 60 percent urban households, who are the main consumers of these energy 
sources. Increase in electricity prices would also affect the urban poor to a lesser 
extent. The poorest households are mostly affected by increase in prices of firewood, 
and these been also been rising quite rapidly in recent years. 
Rising prices of fuel oil and petroleum products have posed a heavy burden on 
the Pakistani economy and have been attributed as an important determinant of the 
rising overall price levels in recent months. Our analysis shows that while the impact of 
increase in POL prices may be quite widespread, the most direct burden is borne by the 
top 20 percent urban households. Increase in prices of public road transport, often 
resulting from sustained increases in POL prices, has the biggest impact on the poor.     
The poorest 40 percent households have a relatively low price elasticity of 
demand for education. Thus increase in the cost of education (particularly education 
fees) would have a negative impact on poor households. Interestingly, middle-
income groups have the highest price elasticity of demand for education. It could 
well be that with rising cost of education children belonging to middle-income 
groups are more likely to shift from relatively higher cost/quality private schools to 
lower cost-quality public schools. These results suggest that provision of high quality 
and affordable education for the poor and middle-income groups should be a key 
element of the government’s poverty reduction programmes.  
Tables 6 and 7 show results of total expenditure elasticity of demand.19 This 
could be taken as a proxy for permanent income elasticity because of habit 
persistence in consumption behaviour. As expected we find that expenditure 
elasticity of demand for essential foods (Food1) is relatively low for all income 
groups. Engles curve effects are also visible in the progressive reduction of the 
income elasticity of demand for Food1 and Food2 by higher income classes.  
 
18The cross-price elasticities with respect to Food1 (not reported here) were also quite high for the 
poorest 40 percent households, especially with respect to demand for furniture, ceremonies, and Food2. 
For the rural poor, Food1 and education also showed high cross price effects, indicating that the rural poor 
children are likely to drop out of school as a result of rising food prices.  
19Our aggregate results are very similar to Ali’s (1985) for 1979. 
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Table 6 
Expenditure Elasticity of Demand—Urban 
        Bottom 40%           Middle 40%            Top 20% 
Food1 0.72 Food1 0.46 Food1 0.35 
Fuel 0.74 Fuel 0.77 Clothing 0.55 
Clothing 0.89 Footwear 0.80 Footwear 0.57 
Footwear 0.94 Clothing 0.82 Medical Care 0.62 
Medical Care 0.97 Personal Care 0.94 Fuel 0.65 
Personal Care 1.16 Medical Care 1.11 Education 0.73 
Education 1.29 Others 1.13 Personal Care 0.79 
Food2 1.32 Food2 1.32 Food2 0.80 
Others 1.35 Housing 1.52 Furniture 1.32 
Housing 1.37 Education 1.54 Housing 1.41 
Transportation 1.41 Furniture 1.59 Others 1.44 
Furniture 2.37 Transportation 1.68 Transportation 1.85 
Source: Estimated from HIES 1996-97. 
 
Table 7 
Expenditure Elasticity of Demand—Rural 
              Bottom 40%          Middle 40% Top 20% 
Clothing 0.84 Food1 0.81 Footwear 0.37 
Food1 0.89 Clothing 0.87 Clothing 0.38 
Medical Care 1.00 Personal Care 1.02 Food1 0.41 
Fuel 1.00 Medical Care 1.02 Personal Care 0.61 
Personal Care 1.00 Others 1.06 Food2 0.74 
Housing 1.01 Fuel 1.06 Furniture 1.37 
Transportation 1.07 Footwear 1.07 Housing 1.39 
Footwear 1.11 Food2 1.14 Education 1.42 
Others 1.22 Transportation 1.31 Medical Care 1.75 
Education 1.24 Education 1.33 Transportation 1.96 
Food2 1.36 Housing 1.33 Others 2.18 
Furniture 2.19 Furniture 2.54 Fuel 2.25 
Source: Estimated from HIES 1996-97. 
 
Only Food1 and clothing fall in the category of “necessities” for the bottom 
80 percent of rural households, with expenditure elasticity of demand less than unity. 
The urban poor have a somewhat expanded list of “necessities”, including the above 
two categories and also fuel, footwear and medical care. Expenditures on 
furniture/fixtures, transport, housing and miscellaneous others fit the description of 
“luxury” goods for all groups, with high expenditure elasticity of demand. However, 
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for the poorest urban and rural groups, expenditures on certain types of foods 
(Food2), education and medical care, show high expenditure demand elasticity, 
indicating that these are viewed as non-essential expenditures by poor households.    
Except for the top 20 percent households, education seems to be a ”luxury” 
good for most Pakistani household—its income elasticity of demand ranges between 
1.24–1.54. Hence, if taking education to the poor is a goal of our poverty reduction 
strategy, it is not only important to lower the cost of education but also to increase 
income levels by generating pro-poor growth, so that poor households can afford the 
“luxury” of educating their children. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The paper had a very modest aim of deriving partial equilibrium estimates 
that would enable one to evaluate the households’ demand responses. Our analysis 
shows that households are revealing expenditure patterns indicative of tight budget 
constraints being faced by them. Most Pakistani households have shifted 
expenditures toward basic needs and away from non-essential items over the 1987-
88 – 1996-97—a period associated with rapidly increase in price levels and with very 
slowly rising real incomes.  
Rise in food prices have a big impact on the poorest households in rural and urban 
areas. High own-price elasticity of demand for food combined with high expenditure 
allocations on food indicate that the poorest households in Pakistan are facing a 
distressful situation due to food price hikes. There is therefore a need to ensure that food 
prices do not increase rapidly, especially for those items that are staple foods for the poor. 
In addition, interventions are needed to compensate the poorest and vulnerable groups for 
increase in food prices and elimination of food subsidies. The government’s newly 
initiated Food Support Programme and increase in “Guzara” allowance for Zakat 
recipients are steps in the right direction. There is a need do careful evaluations of these 
programmes and perhaps the scope and size of these initiatives as well as expand the 
purview of social safety nets for the poorest of the poor.  
Our results also show that education is seen as a luxury good by a vast 
majority of Pakistani households. The analysis of shares, price- and income elasticity 
of demand for education also point toward a need for innovative interventions for 
providing affordable and quality education to the poor. Unless provision of education 
is made part of the government’s poverty reduction strategy, the disparities of 
income and wealth are likely to persist and even exacerbate over time.        
 
ANNEXURE 
 
THE LINEAR EXPENDITURE SYSTEM 
We assuming that all household decisions are made on per capita basis. We 
also assume that except for income and prices, all other factors such as age, 
education, occupation, do not affect consumption. For each type of households the 
expenditure behaviour can be described as: 
How Do the Poor Respond to Rising Prices? 839
ei = pixi = piγi + βi (Ei – Σ piγi) … … … … (1) 
where 
 i = 1, 2,……., n good. 
 ei = household expenditure on good i. 
 pi = price of good i. 
 xi = per capita consumption of good i. 
 Ei = household total expenditure (a proxy for permanent income). 
The two parameter that are estimated (γi, βi) represent the subsistence quantity 
of good i and the marginal budget shares, respectively. (Ei – Σ piγi) is referred to as 
the supernumerary expenditure. 
The stochastic specification of the LES is written as: 
eih = αi + βi Eh + εih  … … … … … … (2) 
where h = 1, 2,……, H households, αi = γi* + βi Σ γi* and εih is the error term with the 
usual properties. 
The model described in (2) is one of identical regressors. We have used OLS 
and cross equation restrictions to derive the price, cross price and income 
(expenditure) elasticity of demand.  
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Comments 
 
I would like to start with the paragraph where the authors state. “assuming 
that HIES  surveys of 1987-88 and  1996-97 are fairly comparable,” before they 
begin to start presenting the results.  If they had checked with any regular users of 
HIES data they would have known that this assumption is not at all plausible.  Why? 
Because the post-1991 HIES questionnaires, the  primary sampling units (PSUs) for 
samples, sample sizes, and clusters and area coverage, were revised very 
significantly.  Therefore to compare pre and post-1991 HIES sample is  not possible 
unless it is made comparable.  This would involve a lot of cleaning of the data and/or 
adjustments to the data to make them comparable. There is no reference to that affect 
in this paper, but the trends in the results for pre and post 1991 period say it all.  
Therefore, the entire analyses based on the wrong assumption of comparable data 
does not hold. 
The authors start the paper by saying that according to the Government of 
Pakistan poverty in Pakistan has increased.  Then they put forward the World Bank 
assessment whereby the preliminary estimates of World Bank show that it may not 
have risen but remained stagnant.  However it may be noted that the panel discussion 
on poverty the evening before this presentation, at this forum, established beyond 
any doubt that poverty has increased in Pakistan. Furthermore PES  (1999-2000) 
reports Gini-coefficients since 1963-64 to show the improvements and the worsening 
of distribution of income between the lowest 20 percent and the top 20 percent.  
These results are based on a consistent methodology and comparable groups used 
since the sixties.  In this paper, however, Tables 2 and 3 divide the population into 
bottom 40  percent, middle 40 percent and top 20 percent, and then compare bottom 
40 percent with top 20 percent. What a comparison? It is common sense that data 
must be comparable. When we compare bottom 40 percent with top 20 percent it is 
obvious that, of the 60 percent of the middle income group 20 percent have been 
added to the bottom 20 percent. So adding one-third of the middle income group to 
the lowest 20 percent will make it relatively better off.  Hence, the income 
inequilities between  the bottom 40 percent and top 20 percent would be lower, and 
poverty levels may appear to be stagnant, as implied by the World Bank. 
Tables 4 and 5 compare bottom 20 percent middle 40 percent and top 20 
percent, another 20 percent of the middle income group seem to have vanished in 
this air. However again when we read the texts, it implies bottom 40 percent. This is 
a very glaring omission which would not miss the attention of any one who has 
written it, and if not written at least cared to read it once (what we call academic 
courtesy) before submitting to this forum.  This confusion continues in Tables 6 and 
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7 where once again 40 percent poor are compared with the 20 percent of the richest 
population. First the data set is uncomaprable, then the income classes are 
incomparable one wonders what’s going on? 
The authors refer to five very comprehensive studies on the subject. Now 
except for the new data set of 1996-97, which itself is not comparable, what is new 
or special about this study? In fact by avoiding reasonable disaggregation  of food 
items as is done in all those studies, they project their study to be superior to 
previous studies because they get different results.  If one looks at the indepth 
analysis of the most important subgroup-food in these studies, it is not at all difficult 
to see that this analysis is very superficial compared to those studies. 
The contradictions in the paper are also very striking.  On page 8 it is 
concluded that all income groups are adjusting their budgets to cope with the effects 
of rising prices by increasing expenditure on food, fuel and housing and cutting other 
non-essential expenditure.  However on page 10 it is concluded that as food prices 
increase the poor are forced to cut their food expenditures relatively more compared 
to other groups.  Implying the others were doing the same to a lesser extend.  Which 
statement to take? 
On page 10 it is very difficult to accept the argument that poor did not feel the 
brunt of utility prices increases I am sure policy-makers would be pleased to hear 
this.  The fact remains that both electricity and gas are inputs to flour mills, petrol is 
input to all goods transported from point of production to the market.  Electricity 
prices have been followed by increase of flour prices. Gas price increases have raised 
the price of gas tandoor rotis in all markets of Islamabad, which is the major 
purchase item of poor resources away from their homes. 
Furthermore the poor, both rural and urban use kerosine oil, prices of kerosine 
oil have been increasing quite rapidly. The official argument offered is, “to avoid 
mixing it with diesel”. However, the government would never want to know, or 
knowingly not acknowledge, that it is a relatively convenient and cheap fuel  in 
urban as well as in rural areas.  Findings of studies like these would be comforting to 
the government, but hurting to the poor. 
Similarly it is not correct to say the increase in price of electricity would 
not  affect the poor.  Due to the rapid rate of village electrification almost all the 
urban slums and a very large number of villages are receiving electricity 
connections very rapidly. What do they take these connections for? — to benefit 
from the use of it obviously.  Therefore a rise in its price affects them directly. 
The matter of fact is that even if we do not use electricity all, we have to pay a 
minimum amount equivalent to the kilowatt load of the meter installed.  For 12 
kilowatt load the minimum charges are Rs 280 per month, and for the minimum 
5 kilowatt load the charges are Rs 100 per month, whether we use/consume the 
electricity or not.  
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In case we do it is adjusted against the units  consumed if the consumption is 
above Rs 275 or Rs 100.1  Otherwise one must pay these minimum rates in any case. 
The authors rightly put in the last para on page  10 that increase in fare prices due to 
increase in petrol price affect the poor most; and they are absolutely right to suggest 
that this increase must to be evaluated. But they must acknowledge that the same 
argument applies to the rise in the  prices of kerosene oil, gas and electricity. 
It is unfortunate that an uncomaparable data set has been used to put forward 
such misleading findings. One must be careful in making sweeping statements based 
of faulty evidence, because they affect the lives of the most disadvantaged groups. 
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1Source: Billing Section, Revenue Office, WAPDA, G-7, Islamabad.  
